INTRODUCTION
Brazil recently experienced one of the world's worst environmental disasters when the Samarco mining company's Fundão tailings dam burst. This tragic disaster, which occurred on 5 November, 2015, killed 17 people, swept away a district of the town of Mariana, polluted the Rio Doce river valley and degraded the water supply of 35 towns, negatively affecting the lives of millions of Brazilians (Aragão & Paes, 2016) , and even impacting the waters of the South Atlantic. This was the world's worst environmental disaster involving a tailings dam to date (Bowker, 2015) . As of June 2016, polluted sediment was still washing through the river and Samarco had still not paid the fines imposed on it. The mining company, jointly controlled by Australian-based multinational BHP Billiton and Brazil's Vale, was previously recognized as a leader in environmental standards, receiving numerous international awards and certifications (as did its joint owners). Although it is still too early to confirm with any certainty, since the investigations are still underway, there is evidence that this disaster was the result of a lack of adequate regulation, both by the market and by the state (Phillips, 2015) .
The Samarco case emphasises the dangers of allowing multinationals to operate without adequately monitoring their activities. There is an increased awareness that multinationals can cause serious problems for the environment, the workforce, the state, and communities at large. As many of these problems are transnational as well as national, they cannot be resolved by nations alone. However, creating international organizations through agreements between nation-states and then implementing international rules and legal sanctioning-mechanisms has proved problematic. Transnational social movements have used reputational mechanisms to embarrass firms in front of their employees, their customers and their shareholders when they have transgressed broadly-accepted standards. The goal of creating a structure that encourages good behaviour has led to the formation of systems of certified rules and labelling. In these multistakeholder contexts, social movements, firms and states have developed rules and monitoring systems that provide consumers, shareholders and states with certain guarantees. These ensure that particular products meet particular pre-agreed standards and they are labelled accordingly with recognisable badges, such as, for example, those of the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC).
There are, however, multiple problems associated with this particular model, some of which are explored in our Forum. One of these involves competing labelling and regulatory brands, some established by firms to offer a more lenient regulatory regime than would otherwise be unacceptable if a transnational social movement were involved (Bartley, Koos, Samel, Setrini, & Summer, 2015) . Another problem concerns monitoring and the considerable variations found in local contexts and practices that challenge the rather generic standards usually negotiated in global partnerships, such as in the case of aquaculture in Indonesia (Schounten, Vellema, & Wijk, 2016) . The interaction between transnational social movements and national states is also problematic. States often legitimately claim authority over their territories and obstruct or object when transnational social movements become involved. This is especially an issue between states in the Global South, whose concern is with rapid development in order to reduce poverty, and social movements in the North, who often advocate caps on growth. Unlike governments, transnational social movements are not elected. On the other hand, governments can be subject to corruption that prevents hard laws, regulations and sanctions from being implemented properly, even when these governments have the capacity to do the job and a sufficiently extensive cadre of experts bound by bureaucratic rules and careers at their disposal. With these issues in mind, the focus of this Forum is on the development of transnational governance mechanisms, and how multinationals, social movements and states, particularly in the Global South, deal with the challenges they represent.
Drawing on Polanyi, we look at the transnational governance literature that is the subject of this Forum and 
THE STATE, POLANYI, AND THE 'DOUBLE MOVEMENT'
Although 21
st Century capitalism has its own unique features, its development can still be seen through the lens of Polanyi's 'double movement' (Block, 2008 Thus, markets become socially embedded and free markets are no more than myths (Polanyi, 2001 ).
Nevertheless, the 'double movement' suggests that forces supporting the reduction of the state and the expansion of the market will continue their struggle to push the pendulum back the other way and away from the state. Block (2008) argues that the movement to disembed the market from society creates a great burden on ordinary people because they are obliged to endure the higher costs it implies. Consequently, the state's efforts are often necessary to ensure that these groups are able to tolerate such costs without engaging in disruptive activism. Thus, the 'double movement' creates a paradox, where the force of the state is necessary in order to impose the market logic and to control the associated risk of social disruption caused by increasing social tensions (Polanyi, 2001) . controlling markets. This is illustrated, in the Samarco case, by the role of the transnational social movement, Greenpeace, which has demanded justice for the victims, but has done so by using different methods, thereby reflecting the importance of going beyond Polanyi's initial formulation. Greenpeace Australia Pacific has organised protests at BHP Billiton's headquarters in Australia using information about the disaster received from Greenpeace
Brazil to better inform its campaign (Greenpeace, 2015 (Delgado, 2016) . Brazil. This emerging discontent across national boundaries and the weak and ineffective government response to it has led to a search for other forms of resistance.
TRANSNATIONAL NGOs AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS GOVERNANCE ACTORS
Transnational governance can assume two forms: soft law, such as certification, self-regulation, or co-regulated standards (public and private partners develop such standards together); and hard law, involving traditional command and control legislation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) . As hard law is difficult to achieve at the transnational level, soft law mechanisms tend to predominate although the two can be combined. For example, the US Lacey Act makes it illegal to import timber sourced from non-sustainable forests; having the seal of approval from the FSC is prima facie evidence of compliance with this rule.
Therefore, in this case, soft law and hard law combine against the US importation of timber from unsustainable sources.
Transnational governance has three main characteristics.
Firstly, it involves multiple public and private sector actors Transnational governance has, however certain weaknesses. Are these systems accountable, for example? Certainly not to electorates. There is no real 'democratic' element to them, except perhaps obliquely through the role that democratically elected states may play, which is often weak compared to that of corporations. Transnational NGOs also offer limited accountability; their most important donors are often kept secret and policy is decided by officials that are often appointed rather than elected. Fontoura, Bharucha, and Bohm (2016) The interaction between global standards emerging from multi-stakeholder partnerships in the North and local practices in the South is the focus of a paper by Schounten et al. (2016) .
In analysing the Aquaculture Stewardship Council experience in Indonesia, they show how global standards can transform and guide sustainable change in supply chains. This largely depends, however, on their flexibility and responsiveness to bridging the extensive gap between global norms and the great variety of local cultural, technical and political practices.
The Global South and transnational governance
Why is transnational governance particularly important to the Global South? States in advanced economies have developed their regulatory systems over many decades. These have weakened somewhat under the impact of neo-liberalism and the discourse of deregulation, but they still maintain a role in many areas of social life. In structure, they are often Weberian bureaucracies that value expertise and neutrality in return for assured salaries and careers.
Such systems also tend to have relatively well functioning hard law with a long tradition of jurisprudence and judicial neutrality.
These systems can be corrupted, but in institutional terms, they tend to offer a degree of stability and path dependency that makes state regulation work, to a greater or lesser extent. These then constitute part of the state's capacity in advanced economies. In this Forum we bring together a range of papers addressing this interaction between states, firms, social movements and transnational governance mechanisms in an effort to heighten awareness of the importance of this area of social research and its implications for public policy. We hope to encourage readers to examine the development of transnational governance in more depth and to consider its promise, limits, and challenges in terms of promoting a better world for all.
